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12. Current Issues on Joint Operating Agreements
Patrick W. Gray
Amy A. Lee
Johnson Gray McNamara, LLC
Lafayette, Louisiana
I. The JOA Concept
This paper discusses current issues regarding joint operating
agreements, focusing on recent decisions from courts in Louisiana. For
the purposes of this paper, the "current" timeframe is roughly ten years,
although there will be some reference to older cases that touch on issues
that we think art: pertinent today. Because it is the most frequently used
form for onshorc operations, AAPL Form 610, last revised in 1989, will
be used as the contract of reference.
A joint operating agreement is the means by which persons in the
oil and gas industry jointly develop a prospect and share in the risks and
rewards of exploration and production. It is defined as "[a]n agreement
between or among interested parties for the operation of a tract or
leasehold for oil, gas and other minerals."' A JOA typically provides "for
the development of the premises for the joint account," and the parties
"share in the expenses of the operations and in the proceeds of
development, but the agreement normally is not intended to affect the
ownership of the minerals or the rights to produce."2
The concepi is simple, i.e., to get wells drilled while spreading costs
and sharing benefits. Practicality dictates that someone has to be in
charge, so an operator is appointed. The problem is that, historically,
parties did not pay much of a premium to the operator. Presumably,
control was its own reward. Because there was no real financial reward
to the operator, there naturally was an attempt to limit the potential
liability the operitor might incur because of his status, in particular, his
liability to the rion-operators. On the other hand, because the non-
operators. had no real control, the non-operators have historically
attempted to shl.eld themselves from actions by third parties to the
agreement. These concepts form the most basic tenets behind operating
agreements in geieral and the AAPL form in particular.
Much of the focus of this paper will be on the legal implications of
the form and content of the JOA arrangement. Beyond this basic concept,
the paper will di cuss not only how the agreement functions between the
parties who initially entered into it, but also the problems that arise when
parties to the agreement change, or when things are not done as
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anticipated under the agreement, and how and when ithe agreement
expires.
II. Rights and Responsibilities of the Operator
Article V of the Form 610 operating agreement establishes the
rights and duties of the operator. Initially it addresses the designation and
responsibility of the operator, requires that the parties name the operator,
and states that the operator shall "conduct and direct and have full
control of all operations on the Contract Area as permitted and required
by, and within the limits of this agreement."' It also provides that the
operator shall be an independent contractor, that the operator will not be
or hold itself out as "agent" of non-operators, and that the operator "shall
not have the authority to bind" the non-operators "to any obligation or
liability assumed or incurred by Operator as to any third party." It
further states that the operator must conduct its activities in a reasonably
prudent manner in accordance with good oil field practice and in
compliance with applicable law and regulation, but it goes on to provide
that "in no event shall [the operator] have any liability as operator to the
other parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred except such as
may result from gross negligence or willful misconduct."'
Furthermore, Article VII sets forth a disclaimer regarding the nature
of the agreement and the duties and liabilities involved:
It is not the intention of the parties to create, nor shall this
agreement be construed as creating, a mining or other partnership,
joint venture, agency relationship or association, or to render the
parties liable as partners, co-venturers, or principals. In their
relations with each other under this agreement, the parties shall not
be considered fiduciaries or to have established a confidential
relationship but rather shall be free to act on an arm's-length basis
in accordance with their own respective self-interest, subject,
however, to the obligations of the parties to act in good faith in their
dealings with each other with respect to activities hereunder.'
Thus, the agreement provides quite clearly that the operator acts only for
itself when dealing with the outside world, and that the operator's
potential for liability to non-operators is extremely limited. Even though
the above provisions in the JOA rather succinctly set out the relationship
of the parties between themselves and with reference to others, problems
A.A.P.L. Form 610 (1989) Model Form Operating Agreement, Art. V (emphasis
added).
4 Id
5 Id (emphasis added).
6 Id Art. VII (emphasis added).
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arise because courts often find a legal relationship that has different
implications thar. those stipulated by the parties.
III. Is the ]RELATIONSHIP a Joint Venture or Partnership?
Certain legal rights and responsibilities flow from the
characterization of a relationship. Co-owners, partners, joint venturers,
principals and agents: each of these legal determinations has
consequences to the rights and obligations that exist between the parties
and as to outside parties. There has been quite a bit of litigation over
whether the JOA confers partnership or joint venture status because of
these legal implications. The JOA declares that it is "not a partnership"
and that the parties are "not ... fiduciaries," but courts nevertheless have
found that how the parties characterize the relationship is not conclusive
as to its legal status. In doing so, courts have sometimes found that the
agreement is a partnership or a joint venture, that the parties owe
fiduciary duties to one another, and that the partners (i.e., the non-
operators) can be responsible to third parties, despite stipulations to the
contrary.
A joint venture can be defined as "a special combination of two or
more persons, where in some specific venture a profit is jointly sought
without any actual partnership or corporate designation." 7 "The essential
elements of a joint venture are generally the same as those of partnership,
i.e., two or more parties combining their property, labor, skill, etc., in the
conduct of a venture for joint profit, with each having some right of
control."8 The difference is that a joint venture is usually formed for a
limited duration or purpose, whereas a partnership is usually formed to
transact general business of a particular kind.9 The criteria for a joint
venture or partnership are:
1. A contract between two or more persons;
2. A juridical entity or person is established;
3. Contribution by all parties of either efforts or resources;
4. The contribution must be in determinate proportions;
5. There must be joint effort; -
6. There must be a mutual risk vis-A-vis losses;
7. There must be a sharing of profits.10
7 Coffee Bay Investors, L.L.C. v. W.O.G.C. Co., 03-0406, p. 7 (La. App. I Cir.
4/2/04), 878 So. 2d 655, 670 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
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Louisiana law generally applies the rules of partnerships to joint
ventures. The fiduciary duty that is owed between members of a joint
venture is the same as that which exists between partners in a
partnership.1 This fiduciary duty is a heightened standard of conduct
that may be owed between the partners or joint venturers. Louisiana Civil
Code article 2809 provides that "[a] partner owes a fiduciary duty to the
partnership and to his partners." It also states that a partner "may not
conduct any activity, for himself or on behalf of a third person, that is
contrary to his fiduciary duty and is prejudicial to the partnership. If he
does so, he must account to the partnership and to his partners for the
resulting profits."l 2 Therefore, the significance of the partnership finding
is that the participants are fiduciaries who owe one another the highest
degree of care in the transaction of the affairs of the entity.' 3
Inasmuch as the JOA seems to fit the classical definition of a
partnership or joint venture, litigation has arisen involving both third
party liability and the liability of their partners inter se. Historically, the
courts looked at the nature of the venture and identified it as what it
appeared to be, and in doing so, often ignored self-serving language in
the JOA trying to negate the existence of a partnership.14 What courts
often overlook is Louisiana Mineral Code article 215,'5 which
specifically states that a JOA is not a partnership unless it expressly says
that it is. Artice 215 reads as follows:
A written contract for the joint exploration, development, or
operation of mineral rights does not create a partnership unless the
contract expressly so provides.
In effect, the article reverses the rule that the court should look to
the substance of the relationship rather than to the declaration of the
parties. There are very few cases applying this Code article, although it
obviously addresses the joint operating agreement situation and negates
the existence of a partnership (or joint venture), absent a specific
declaration creating the partnership. A literal reading of article 215
would apply it only to written contracts, thus implicating only those
contracts which must be in writing to have efficacy. Because of the
somewhat arbitrary manner in which the writing requirement has been
' See id. at pp. 7-8, 878 So. 2d at 670; see also Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v.
McNamara, 452 So. 2d 212 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1984).
12 Id
13 See Grand Isle Campsites, Inc. v. Cheek, 262 So. 2d 350 (La. 1972).
14 See, e.g., Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. McNamara, 452 So.2d 212 (La. App. 1
Cir. 1984).
15 La. R.S. 31:215.
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enforced by the courts, it is not certain that this reading of the article will
result in the full scope of coverage seemingly intended by the legislature.
IV. Duties Owed among the Parties to the JOA
As demonstiated in the decisions discussed below, JOA participants
are generally at arms' length and do not require special protection, and
thus the courts should not be inclined to find those fiduciary duties
generally arising from partnership or joint venture status. In Dime Box
Petroleum Corp. v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co.," the non-
operator, Dime Box, claimed that the operator, LL&E, owed a fiduciary
duty and was liable because it obtained some purchasing advantages that
it did not share with the venture. The court found that this was an area in
which a fiduciary relationship could conceivably be imposed, but
because the parties were both sophisticated and of equal bargaining rank,
because the operating agreement had disavowed a joint undertaking, and
because the parties had specifically stated that the measure of the
operator's liability would be "gross negligence or willful misconduct,"
the court concluded that there was no joint venture and no fiduciary
relationship. Dime Box was a Colorado case, but the reasoning regarding
equal footing would, as a general rule, apply equally in Louisiana.
In a case applying Louisiana law, Caddo Oil Co. v. O'Brien,"
O'Brien claimed that Caddo, as operator, owed a fiduciary duty and an
accounting. The accounting obligation would effectively have shifted the
burden from O'Brien to disprove the correctness of operating charges to
Caddo, who would have to account for and justify all charges. The court
held that the operator owed no such fiduciary duty:
O'Brien is itcorrect. Caddo was under no duty to provide O'Brien
with an accointing. Rather, the onus was on O'Brien to conduct an
audit if he believed one necessary. Under the terms of the Operating
Agreement, the Operator is liable to the Owners only in cases of the
Operator's willful misconduct. The terms of the Operating
Agreement control, and Caddo's actions are to be judged by a
prudent operator standard, not by that of a fiduciary."
More recent Louisiana cases shed light on the partnership/joint
venture-fiduciary Iuty issue. One is the case of Johnco, Inc. v. Jameson
Interests." Through inheritance and an agreement, Johnco and Jameson
owned minerals :n indivision. Then, as the court described it, they
partitioned the minerals but combined their mineral rights affecting the
same property. They separately leased their respective mineral rights. By
'1 717 F. Supp. 717 (D. Co. 1989); aff'd938 F.2d 1144 ( 1 0 th Cir. 1991).
' 908 F.2d 13 (5 " Cir. 1990).
" Id. at 17.
19 98-1925 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/23/99), 741 So. 2d 867.
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virtue of a deal with a geologist and geophysicist to promote exploration
of the property, Jameson received an overriding royalty interest and the
potential for additional cash. Johnco felt entitled to a share of that
additional consideration and sued everyone, claiming a fiduciary duty
based upon co-ownership and joint venture theories. The court held that
the existence of a joint venture would be a fact determination,
"ultimately predicated upon contract either express or implied,"20 and
upheld the lower court's finding that no joint venture existed. The court
then avoided the fiduciary duty/co-ownership issue by finding no co-
ownership of the mineral rights between Johnco and Jameson. The
concurring opinion correctly observed that a finding of co-ownership, in
and of itself, would not have necessarily resulted in the establishment of
a fiduciary obligation. The court's reference to a potential implied joint
venture suggests that parol evidence might have been allowed to
establish such a relationship, with its attendant fiduciary obligation. The
court's suggestion notwithstanding, it wourd seem that a written
agreement would be necessary to create a joint venture under these facts.
Coffee Bay Investors, L.L.C. v. W.O.G.C. Co.21 involved both a joint
operating and ancillary agreements between an investment firm and an
oil and gas well operator. Coffee Bay provided W.O.G.C., the operator,
with funds to drill a well in exchange for an undivided 50% interest in
the oil and gas leases affecting the well prospect. Coffee Bay agreed to
share expenses related to the development of the prospect. The
anticipated well was never drilled and the venture failed, without
W.O.G.C. ever assigning the lease. The court found that even absent a
formal assignment, Coffee Bay was bound to pay the agreed-upon
consideration. It then held that the arrangement amounted to a joint
venture, even though the agreement expressly disavowed the parties'
intent to create either a partnership or a joint venture. The court
remanded the case for a determination of whether the failure of the
venture was the result of a breach of W.O.G.C.'s fiduciary duty.
Another recent case in which the court has looked past the wording
of the agreement to its substance is Phoenix Associates Land Syndicate,
Inc. v. E.H. Mitchell & Co., LLC.22 This case involved a purported
operating agreement between a lessee and third party operator. The lease
contained a provision that prohibited subleasing. The court found that the
relationship between the lessee and the operator was in fact a sublease in
violation of the anti-subleasing provision. The court looked at the
substance of the "operating agreement" and found that the agreement
transferred ownership of the solid minerals to the third party and not just
20 Id. at p. 13, 741 So. 2d 871.
21 03-0406 (La. App. I Cir. 4/2/04), 878 So. 2d 665.
22 07-0108 (La. App. I Cir. 9/14/07).
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the ability to operate the mining venture. Therefore, despite the parties'
agreement that the operating agreement was not and should not be
construed as a lease or a sublease, the court found that it was exactly that.
In Double-Eight Oil & Gas L.L. C v. Caruthurs Producing Co.,23 the
court held that a co-owner operator, in the absence of an operating
agreement, owed a fiduciary duty to the non-operating owners. The court
went on to find that the duties were not actually breached under the facts.
The court repeatedly noted that there was not an operating agreement
between the parties, but did not discuss whether the situation would have
been different if there were an operating agreement.
Riddle v. Simmons24 involved the purchase of a large tract of land by
several parties. The intent behind the purchase of the property was
primarily a real estate development, but it also involved the development
of minerals. The facts are fairly complicated, and involve various
transfers, rights, obligations and interests, and the use of different legal
entities by various parties. The simplified facts are that, at various points,
there were discussions among the co-owners about developing mineral
rights and securing the right to purchase gas in the field. Ultimately, one
of the co-owners, Simmons, obtained a gas transportation agreement and
constructed a pipeline to transport gas for a fee. The court found a joint
venture and forced Simmons to share profits with the other co-owners.,
The court held that this agreement did not require a writing because thejoint venture did not focus on the pipeline (an immovable), but rather the
ability to obtain gas for transportation in the pipeline, which was the
source of the joint venture's profit.
V. Significance of the Writing Requirement
As noted, Riddle v. Simmons raised the issue of whether a writing
would be required,. depending upon whether the venture dealt with
immovable property. Numerous other cases have discussed the writing
requirement in wrying contexts, with mixed results. The weight of the
authority seems tb be that, when mineral leases, the operations thereon
and production therefrom are at issue, a writing is required. Nevertheless,
there is a fair amount of inconsistency over the necessity of a writing for
agreements governing mineral-related activities. The impact of these
determinations vary depending on the issue in the lawsuit, i.e.,
partnership or joint venture status, venue, choice of law, or validity of
judgments, but the analysis should theoretically produce consistent
results. Although it is not certain how it will be resolved when the facts
are established, the courts seem to make the issue of a writing
requirement dependent upon the manner in which the right or obligation
23 41,451 (La. Apr. 2 Cir. 11/20/06), 942 So. 2d 1279.
24 40,000 (La. App. 2 Cir. 02/16/06), 922 So. 2d 1267.
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at issue is sought to be enforced, rather than upon the actual nature of the
right or obligation.
The result in Riddle v. Simmons is consistent with an earlier
Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Hawthorne v. Conoco," in which
the court held that a suit against a pipeline company to rescind a gas
purchase contract was not an action to assert an interest in immovable
property, even though the pipeline itself was considered an immovable.
A similar analysis, leading to a different conclusion, is found in the
Fourth Circuit in Court of Appeal case of CLK Co. v. CXY Energy Inc. 16
This case was based upon the failure to convey an overriding royalty
interest, and the plaintiff attempted to cast his claim in a way that
sounded like a claim for money compensation. The court concluded: "the
fact that CLK's claim is compensable in money does not preclude it from
being categorized as an immovable or as a real right."" The court found
that the interest subject to that dispute was a real right. The First Circuit
Court of Appeal in Rock Energy, Inc. v. Equity Oil Co.2 8 held to the
contrary in an action for half of the proceeds from an assignment of
seismic options. The court distinguished CLK and found that, even
assuming that the seismic options were "incorporeal immovables,"' 9 the
object of the action was money, and not an interest in the actual options.
The Third Circuit case of Ironwood Resources, Ltd. v. Baby Oil,
Inc.30 involved complaints by a non-operator that the operator improperly
refused to allow an audit, improperly charged and netted expenses,
refused to authorize direct payment of revenues to the non-operators, and
failed to communicate with the non-operators. The court discussed CLK
and Rock Energy as well as other prior cases, and found this to be an
action asserting rights in incorporeal immovable property. The court
reasoned: "Plaintiffs sub judice seek to protect their interests in
immovable property by enforcing a contract under which Defendants
operate and manage their interest in that immovable property."" Under
this rationale, which seems correct, any claim seeking to enforce the
rights or obligations flowing from the management or operation of
mineral rights would be one asserting a right in immovable property. As
such, disputes relating to operating agreements involve interests in
immovable property, and should be written.
25 377 So. 2d 285 (La. 1979).
26 98-0802 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/16/98), 719 So. 2d 1098.
27 Id. at p. 17, 719 So. 2d at 1104.
28 01-1005 (La. App. I Cir. 5/10/02), 818 So. 2d 920.
29 Id. at p. 7, 818 So. 2d at 922.
30 05-467 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/1/06), 921 So. 2d 1189.
31 Id. at p. 7, 921 So. 2d at 1193.
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While, in many cases, these decisions are meant to resolve questions
of venue and other procedural issues, they are of great moment with
respect to the issue of whether a fiduciary relationship exists. Applying
article 215 of the Mineral Code and requiring a written operating
agreement should negate the existence of that status and any special
(fiduciary-type) obligations that might arise thereunder. The JOA's
standard disclaimer about an intent to form a partnership or joint venture
should be unnecessary but would serve to reinforce the conclusion that
no partnership or joint venture exists.
Finally, as a general rule, title to real rights in a state should only be
determined by the law of that state. Two recent out-of-state cases
involving preferential rights to purchase mineral interests under joint
operating agreements reached different results in determining the law of
which state would apply in the extra-territorial adjudication of those
preferential rights claims. Coral Production Corp. v. Central Resources,
Inc.32 involved a Nebraska court applying Texas law to a Nebraska lease
interest, and El Paso Production Co. v. Geomet, Inc.33 involved a Texas
court applying Alabama law to Alabama interests. Louisiana, per Civil
Code article 3535, would require that any adjudication of real rights in
Louisiana immovables be governed by Louisiana law.
VI. Duties Owed to Third Parties
The classification of the entity as a joint venture or partnership also
has significant impact on participants vis-a-vis third persons. Under
Louisiana law, a finding of partnership or joint venture status would
impose liability on the non-operators as partners or joint venturers for
obligations contracted by the operator. The Louisiana Civil Code
specifies the effect of partnership status on persons who deal with the
partnership. Arti-le 2814 makes each partner an agent of the partnership:
A partner is a mandatary of the partnership for all matters in the
ordinary course of its business other than the alienation, lease, or
encumbrance of its immovables. A provision that a partner is not a
mandatory does not affect third persons who in good faith transact
business with the partner.
Article 2815 states that "[a] provision that a partner shall not
participate in los ses does not affect third persons." Furthermore, article
2816 governs when a partner can bind the entire partnership, and by
extension, the other partners:
An obligation contracted for the partnership by a partner in his own
name binds the partnership if the partnership benefits by the
transaction or the transaction involves matters in the ordinary course
32 730 N.W. 2d 3:57 (Neb. 2007).
3 228 S.W. 3d 178 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007).
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of its business. If the partnership is so bound, it can enforce the
contract in its own name.
As noted above, the form JOA expressly provides that it is not a
partnership or joint venture, but nevertheless, courts have been inclined
to ignore self-serving stipulations and analyze the relationship based
upon how it is structured rather than what the parties choose to call it. In
Posey v. Fargo,3 4 Duncan v. Gill,35 and Young v. Reed,"3 the courts held
that joint oil and gas operations constituted a joint venture causing
liability of all participants to third parties. Mineral Code article 215,
discussed above, would seem to obviate this problem, if properly applied
by courts. For the same reasons as it serves to prevent fiduciary
obligation claims between the participants, article 215 should also protect
against third party liabilities.
A related avenue for liability to third parties would seem to be via a
more traditional mandate or apparent authority analysis, without regard
to partnership or joint venture status. The obvious significance is that, in
the event of insolvency of the operator, contractors will often attempt to
hold the non-operators liable for the debts contracted by the operator.
Again, the form JOA contains a disclaimer in Article VII, which states
that "[i]t is not the intention of the parties to create, nor shall this
agreement be construed as creating, a[n] . . . agency relationship."" It
would appear that, absent an affirmative act on the part of the non-
operator which would suggest responsibility, the non-operators, not
having created a formal agency relationship, and in fact, having formally
denied same, should not be personally liable for those debts. The
jurisprudence does not always follow this line of reasoning.
An illustrative case is Liberty Services, Inc. v. Amoco Production
Company," in which Amoco had various arrangements with Alliance
Operating Corporation, including an operating agreement, a unit
agreement, and a facilities operating agreement. The plaintiff, Liberty,
provided services to Alliance, who went bankrupt. In addition to
pursuing lien claims against Alliance's property, Liberty advanced a
number of claims against Amoco based upon the series of agreements,
along with a filing by Amoco with the MMS allowing Alliance to act on
behalf of Amoco with respect to MMS obligations. Liberty alleged that
the agreements and the MMS filing ultimately established a partnership,
joint venture, and/or actual or apparent agency status. While the court
34 187 La. 122, 174 So. 175 (La. 1937).
227 So. 2d 376 (La. App. 4h Cir. 1969).
192 So. 780 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
37 A.A.P.L. Form 610 (1989) Model Form Operating Agreement, Art. VII (emphasis
added).
38 Civ. A. No. 90-4490, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18620 (E.D. La. Dec. 20, 1991).
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acknowledged ihat, under article 215, any partnership or joint venture
would have to be in writing, the court nevertheless refused to make a
ruling on summary judgment about whether the writings at issue
established a partnership or actual agency relationship, but chose rather
to delve further into facts surrounding conduct of the parties. Thus, again
a court is suggesting that a writing requirement is not determinative, and
presumably nor-existent. The only issue the court was able to resolve
without further evidence was apparent authority. Although Liberty
claimed that the MMS filing created apparent authority of Alliance to act
on Amoco's bel alf, the court found that, because Alliance failed to show
that it had seen and relied on the filing before supplying services, it could
not support the apparent authority claim.
Also pertir ent is the recent Louisiana federal district court case
styled Burlington Resources, Inc. v. United National Insurance Co.," in
which Burlington was a non-operator of a well that suffered a blowout.
Burlington sought reimbursement under an insurance policy for its share
of sums paid to :he mineral lessor by the operator for lost reserves due to
the blowout. The policy provided contractual liability coverage as
opposed to general negligence coverage for tort liability. The issue was
whether the settlement with the mineral lessor was necessary because of
Burlington's own negligence or because Burlington was required to
reimburse the operator under the JOA. The claim against the insurance
company was orly valid if it were premised on reimbursement under the
JOA. The court found that, since the operator had full control over
operations, the non-operator had no potential tort liability. Therefore,
because liability was contractual under the JOA, coverage applied. An
interesting reverse twist was provided by the decision of the Louisiana
Fourth Circuit C aurt of Appeal in Helmer Directional Drilling v. Dexco,
Inc.40 There, a drilling contractor sought payment for additional services
under a drilling contract with the operator. The court found as a matter of
credibility that the operator would not have authorized the additional
services claimed by the driller because such would have required the
operator to excee.d its authority for expenditures under the JOA. Thus,
the court looked to the internal limitations of the contract to conclude
that there was no third party liability. In a not dissimilar vein, Mobil
Exploration & Poducing U.S. Inc. v. Certain Underwriters Subscribing
to Cover Note 95-3317(A), 4 1 held that, where an interest owner/non-
operator was a third party beneficiary of the drilling contract and had in
fact accepted benefits of the contract, it was correspondingly bound by
481 F. Supp. 2d 567 (E.D. La. 2007).
40 653 So. 2d 124 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1995).
41 01-2219 (La. App. I Cir. 11/20/02), 837 So. 2d 11.
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the consequential damage limitation in the drilling contract and could not
recover consequential damages from the driller.
VII. The Operator's Standard of Care & the Exculpatory Clause
Aside from the question of loyalty, which is addressed by the
existence vel non of a fiduciary duty, there is also a question of
competence, i.e., to what standard is the operator held in the conduct of
operations? At law, the naturally-applying standard would be normal
negligence, but a gross negligence stipulation, if effective, would change
that. Gross negligence is defined under Louisiana law as "the want of
even slight care . . . the want of that diligence which even careless men
are accustomed to exercise."42 By implication, Louisiana Civil Code
article 2004 allows a change in the standard. That article provides: "Any
clause is null that, in advance, excludes or limits the liability of one party
for intentional or gross fault that causes damage to the other party."
Article 2004 does not permit absolution froro gross fault, but clearly
permits the raising of the standard of liability to gross fault or intentional
misconduct.
In Huggs, Inc. v. LPC Energy, Inc.,43 the Fifth Circuit, applying
Louisiana law, was faced with a situation in which the operator failed to
pay delay rentals on two leases which then expired, and let two others
expire because of failure to conduct operations or assign the leases to the
other participants, who might have maintained them. The court found
that the leases lost because of the failure to pay delay rentals did not
warrant compensation because the applicable agreements specifically
excused the operator from liability from mistake or oversight in
connection with the payment of delay rentals. However, with respect to
those leases lost because they were not maintained by operations and
were not assigned, the court found that the operator had committed gross
negligence and had violated the duty expected of a prudent operator.
There is no mention of the fact that gross negligence was stipulated as a
standard, but it nevertheless is what the court concluded had occurred.
Effectively, the court suggested that a failure to pay delay rentals could
be the result of excusable neglect, but to fail to act to maintain a lease
after production ceases constitutes gross negligence.
Grace-Cajun Oil Co. No. Two v. Damson Oil Corp." involved a
situation in which Damson acted as operator in marketing its own and
Grace Cajun's gas. The operating agreement contained an exculpatory
42 State v. Vinzant, 7 So. 2d 917 (La. 1942); Roton v. Vernon E. Faulconer, Inc.,
42,452 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/3/07), 966 So. 2d 790, 795; First Commonwealth Corp. v.
Hibernia Nat'l Bank ofNew Orleans, 891 F. Supp. 290, amended 896 F. Supp. 634 (E.D.
La. 1995) ajJ'd, 5 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 1996).
889 F.2d 649 (5t" Cir. 1989).
44 897 F.2d 1364 (5t" Cir. 1990).
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clause stating that Damson would have "no liability as Operator to the
other parties for losses sustained, or liabilities incurred, except such as
may result from gross negligence or from breach of the provisions of this
agreement."' Damson marketed the gas to Louisiana Intrastate Gas
Corporation ("LIG") at a price above the then-regulatory price limit. The
higher price received would have been allowed had Dawson filed a well
status application with the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources
and had it approved. Because the well status application was not filed,
LIG recouped the difference between higher and lower prices. Grace-
Cajun ultimately sued Damson for its share of the loss occasioned by the
recoupment. The court did not find gross negligence or a breach of the
operating agrerment, saying: "It is not necessary to resolve whether the
district court applied an improper standard to its determination of
Damson's liability under the operating agreement. The gas purchase
contract clearly defines Damson's duty.'"' The court was not impressed
with Damson'; argument that Grace-Cajun was not a party to the gas
sales agreement with LIG, nor did it choose to apply the exculpatory
clause in the joint operating agreement. Because the gas was sold by
Damson pursuant to the JOA, it would appear that the court was
incorrect in not applying the gross negligence standard to determine
whether the failure to file the application was mere oversight or, in fact,
inexcusable nelect.
There is a series of cases applying or failing to apply the
exculpatory clause from other jurisdictions, and there appears to be a
conflict between the various state and federal courts over the scope of the
exculpatory clause. In Abraxas Petroleum Corp. v. Hamburg,47 the court
held that the exculpatory clause only applied to claims alleging failure to
act as a pruder.t operator, which standard, in turn, only pertained to the
manner in which drilling operations were conducted on a lease. The court
found that, as this was a breach of contract claim in which the operator
had not conducted agreed-upon services, the gross negligence standard
did not apply. Several cases have followed, such as IP Petroleum v.
Wevanco Eneigy, L.L.C.,48 in which the court applied the gross
negligence standard to actual drilling operations. Another is Palace
Exploration Co. v. Petroleum Development Co.,4 9 in which the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an Oklahoma federal district court
opinion finding that there was negligence, but not gross negligence, on
the part of an operator who had made certain misstatements or errors of
45 Id. at 1366.
46 Id. at 1367.
4 20 S.W. 3d 741 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000).
48 116 S.W. 3d 388 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.) 2003).
49 374 F.3d 951 ( 1 0 1h Cir. 2004).
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judgment. Although drilling operations were involved, the court
characterized it as an alleged breach of the JOA, thus supposedly
reconciling its opinion with Abraxas. Despite stated attempts to reconcile
the cases, these results seem inconsistent. Clearly, certain courts are
reluctant to apply the gross negligence standard across the board, while
others will apply the clause as written.
The Louisiana case of Roton v. Vernon E. Faulconer, Inc.'o involved
a claim based on fatal injuries suffered by a teenager while trespassing
on a well site. The court concluded that the operator was not liable, not
based on the exculpatory clause in the JOA, but based on La. R.S.
9:2800.4, which provides:
An owner of oil, gas, or mineral property shall not be liable to any
person who unlawfully enters upon his oil, gas, or mineral property,
for damages for any injury, death, or loss which occurs while on the
oil, gas, or mineral property of the owner, unless such damage,
injury, or death was caused by the intentional act or gross
negligence of the owner."
The court emphasized that the statute includes in the definition of
"owner" a "person ... in control of any oil, gas, or mineral property."
Therefore, the court reached a similar result vis-ai-vis a trespasser under
statutory law as should apply under the exculpatory clause in a joint
operating agreement.
VIII. Enforcement of the JOA
A. Notices and Billing
Although not always, the courts will generally attempt to apply the
parties' agreement as written. For example, in Texaco Exploration &
Production Inc. v. Smackco, Ltd.,s" the operator failed to comply with the
JOA's requirement of 48-hours' notice to the non-operator prior to
abandoning a well. The court held that the non-operator was entitled to
damages in the amount of the cost to re-mobilize the rig and drill to the
point where the operator abandoned the well, which would put the non-
operator in the place it would have been had the contract not been
breached. This result is consistent with an older decision, Lancaster v.
Petroleum Corporation of Delaware,'4 which involved an operator of a
well that blew out during drilling. The operator, Petroleum,
recommended the plugging and abandonment of the well, resigned, and
threatened to plug the well that day unless another operator took over
so 42,452 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/3/07), 966 So. 2d 790.
st La. R.S. 9:2800.4(E) (emphasis added); Roton, 966 So. 2d 795.
52 La. R.S. 9:2800.4(A)(1); Roton, 966 So. 2d at 795.
53 No. CIV. A. 98-2293, 1999 WL 447082 (E.D. La. 1999).
'4 491 So. 2d 768 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
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that day. The operating agreement stated that the operator could resign
upon 90-days' notice. The non-operator, Lancaster, found another
operator by agreeing to give the substitute operator a substantial portion
of his back-in interest. The court found that Petroleum had breached the
operating agreement by failing to honor the ninety-day notice of
resignation provision" and awarded damages based upon the rights that
were given up to entice the new operator into taking over operations.
In Palace Exploration Co. v. Louisiana Exploration & Drilling
Co., the court held that the operator of an oil well was not entitled to
interest and attorney fees in an action to collect unpaid bills from a non-
operator pursuant to the operating agreement. The court reasoned that the
operator did not comply with the plain language of the operating
agreement requiring that the non-operator receive bills for the operator's
services before the interest and attorney fees provision was triggered.
Therefore the operator was entitled to neither contractual nor legal
interest.
B. Status and Rights of Participants
Transfers of interests under an operating agreement can often create
their own unanticipated problems. In Union Oil Co. of California v.
Cheyenne Oil Properties, Inc.," a working interest owner in an offshore
oil and gas lease attempted to transfer its interest to another. Upon
learning of the proported sale, the operator billed the purported transferee
for costs associated with the lease operations and abandonment.
Ultimately, the sale did not occur, so the operator brought suit under the
JOA against the original owner and the purported transferee. The trial
court granted Eummary judgment in favor of the operator against the
original owner. The appellate court reversed, finding that summary
judgment was F rohibited by a factual question as to whether the working
interest owner ,ver effectively conveyed its interest. The operator was
thus not able to collect against the initial working interest owner because
that party had never been billed under the JOA, and there remained a
viable issue as to whether the operator would be able to collect against
the purported transferee due to the question of whether the transfer was
effected. This latter issue was addressed by the trial court in Terrebonne
Parish School Board v. Castex Energy, Inc.,ss although not in the JOA
context. In Cartex, the landowner sought to enforce lease restoration
obligations and the trial court found, inter alia, that there was no liability
" Arguably, the withdrawal would have been actionable even absent a specific
ninety-day notice provision. See Tabco Exploration, Inc. v. Tadlock Pipe & Equipment,
Inc., 617 So. 2d 606 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1993).
01-1063 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/13/02), 812 So. 2d 100.
57 02-1330 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/5/03), 839 So. 2d 1170.
58 01-2634, p. 7 n. 5 (La. App. I Cir. 3/19/04), 878 So. 2d 522, 527.
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on the part of Castex Energy because, although the mineral lease had
been assigned to it by Samson Petroleum, and although Castex Energy
was the current operator of the wells, the assignment had never been
approved by the landowner, as required by the lease.
In Duncan Oil Properties, Inc. v. Vastar Resources, Inc.,5 the court
interpreted language stating that "other parties" were entitled to vote for
a new operator when the current operator sold its working interest. The
court held that the assignee of an operator's working interest became one
of the "other parties" allowed to vote for the new operator. Thus the
assignee under a Form 610 joint operating agreement was entitled to vote
for a new operator after purchasing the operator's rights and interests.
Pittencrieff Resources, Inc. v. Firstland Offshore Exploration Co.,
942 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. La. 1996) is a case involving an offshore
exploration agreement which was not on a "standard" form, although its
provisions, and the problems created, are not atypical. The operating
agreement provided that no well that had once produced could be
abandoned without the consent of all parties owning an interest in the
platform. A non-operator had a desire to take over the platform and
operate it, while the operator and other non-operators wanted it
abandoned, as they were concerned about future exposure if the non-
operator took over the platform and maintained the lease. The operating
agreement allowed any non-operator an election to take over the platform
in the event that abandonment was proposed. As it turns out, the non-
operator was not current on payment of its joint interest billings, and thus
the operator took the position that the non-operator was not entitled to
participate in operations or vote. Inasmuch as exercising the option to
take over the platform and wells required an "election," the question
became whether a party which could not vote, could nevertheless
exercise an election to take over the platform. The court equated electing
to voting and held that a party in default could not elect to take over the
platform and wells.
C. Preferential Rights
There are perennial problems involving identifying and valuing
interests that are subject to rights of first refusal or "preferential rights."
In Online Resources, Inc. v. Stone Energy Corporation,' a party to a
JOA sought to enforce the preferential rights provision in the agreement
against another party who conveyed an overriding royalty interest to an
outside party. The seller took the position that the overriding royalty
interest was not subject to the preferential rights provisions of the JOA,
but the court disagreed. The court concluded that, where the JOA gives a
preferential right to the other interest owners to purchase any "interest"
s9 16 P.3d 465 (Okla. 2000).
60 No. CIV. A. 99-2006, 1999 WL 997495 (E.D. La. 1999).
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that another pany should sell, the term "interest," according to industry
usage, applies to interests beyond the "working interest," including the
overriding royaliy interest.
A more recent case involving the preferential rights provision is
Fordoche Inc. v. Texaco Inc., in which the operator had agreed to sell
interests under four JOAs containing rights of first refusal in favor of
other parties to te JOAs. The operator did offer the interests to the other
working interest owners, but the issue was whether there was a good
faith tender. The proposed sale involved a number of interests in sixteen
separate oil and gas fields along the Gulf Coast, and the four JOAs at
issue were in one of these sixteen fields. Of the $78.7 million sales price,
the "allocated" price for the interests in the four JOAs was around $2
million. When the tender of the right of first refusal was made, the
offerees requested more information. More information was given, but it
was insufficient to satisfy the offerees. Ultimately, the tender was
deemed refused and the interests were sold to the third party. The court
agreed with the plaintiffs that there was an issue as to whether the tender
was in good faith because: (1) there was not an adequate description of
exactly what properties or interests were being sold; (2) the sale included
unitized facilities. actually already co-owned by the offerees; and (3) the
allocated price could not be confirmed as the actual sales price. The case
was remanded to determine whether the tender was in good faith given
these problems. Whether or not this result is correct is not as significant
as is the understanding of the substantial problems created by the rights
of first refusal in sales involving multiple properties or facilities. Carving
specific interests and facilities out of a bulk sale with allocated pricing
will often involvc judgments which create shades of gray in a tender and
acceptance or refusal process that was envisioned as either black or
white. Resolving such issues in the limited time frame available to effect
such a sale presents difficulties.
IX. The Life of the JOA.
An iteration of Article XIII of the form JOA provides that the
agreement remains in existence so long as any of the affected leases are
alive: "This agreement shall remain in full force and effect. . . so long as
any of the Oil and Gas Leases subject to this agreement remain or are
continued in force as to any part of the Contract Area, whether by
production, exten ion, renewal or otherwise."" It goes on to provide that
"[t]he termination of this agreement shall not relieve any party hereto
from any expense, liability or other obligation or any remedy therefor
which has accrued or attached to the date of such termination."63 This
61 463 F.3d 388 (5W Cir. 2006).




Gray and Lee: Current Issues on Joint Operating Agreements
Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2008
would mean that, just because the agreement expires does not mean that
the obligations that "attached" while the agreement was alive are
extinguished. This effectively tracks the law of mineral leases: when
mineral leases expire, some obligations owed under them remain alive -
the restoration obligation in particular. In this regard, the lessee loses
rights but not all obligations.
The case of Isadore v. Probe Offshore, L.L.C." involved a welder
who was injured during restoration operations on a mineral lease
operated by Probe. The welder sued Probe in tort. The court concluded
that Probe was immune from tort liability under the Worker's
Compensation two-contract statutory employer theory. The court
reasoned that Probe was obligated to conduct restoration activities as
both an implied obligation of the mineral lease and under the JOA. The
plaintiff contended that Probe could not avail itself of the two-contract
theory since the mineral lease and the JOA had expired by the time the
restoration activities were being conducted and the accident occurred.
The court noted that "[a] lease's expiration triggers certain restoration
duties for the mineral lessee and the field's operator under the mineral
lease and JOAs" and that "[t]he lessor has ten years to enforce these
obligations in court."s6 The court concluded: "We find that the
obligations under the lease and, the JOAs still existed when Probe
contracted with SWAP for site restoration work. This is true even though
production had ceased under the . . . Mineral Lease at the time that Mr.
Isadore was injured."66 Thus, there is authority for the continued
existence of obligations under the JOA after it and the mineral leases
covered by it expire.
This case was followed by the Louisiana Supreme Court case of
Corbello v. Iowa Production, in which the court stated that the
restoration obligation arises upon the expiration of the mineral lease:
The duty to repair the leased premises does not arise until the lease
expires, at which time the lessee must return the property in good
order. The 1929 mineral lease is still in effect and is not the subject
of this litigation. Thus, even the present leaseholder does not yet
have a duty to repair under the terms of the lease.
01-777 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/19/01), 815 So. 2d. 876.
65 Id. at p. 15, 815 So. 2d at 888.
66 Id. at p. 16, 815 So. 2d at 888.
67 02-0826 (La. 2/25/04), 850 So. 2d 686.
68 Id. at p. 23, 850 So. 2d at 703; see also Kling Realty Co. v. Texaco, Inc., Civ. A.
No. 06-1492, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94322 at *32-33 (W.D. La. Dec. 18, 2007) ("While a
usual contract claim begins to run from the date that the contract was allegedly breached,
the Louisiana Supreme Court held in Corbello v. Iowa Production, 850 So. 2d 686, 705
(La. 2003), that a breach of contract claim under an oil and gas production lease arises
upon termination of the lease.").
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However, the subsequent Third Circuit case of Dord Energy
Corporation v. Carter-Langham, Inc.6' allowed the landowner to proceed
with certain lease remediation claims prior to the expiration of the
mineral lease, thus raising a question about what obligations arise when.
Although its meaning is not entirely clear, the court seemed to conclude
that certain claims are triggered by the cessation of operations in
particular areas of the leased premises, rather than the expiration of the
lease. Therefore, under Dord, the ten-year lease restoration period might
sometimes be i one-year period (due to the one-year liberative
prescription period for tort claims), and it might begin to run prior to the
expiration of the lease.o In any event, for so long as the mineral lease
obligations continue to exist, the JOA rights and obligations should still
apply with respect to these obligations.
X. Conclusion
The jurisprudence involving joint oil and gas operations does not
provide a model of consistency. It would seem that agreement affecting
joint operations under mineral leases should be written, and should not
be construed as joint ventures under specific statutory law (i.e., La. R.S.
31:215), but this is not always the case. Because under Louisiana law
there is nothing prohibiting contracting parties from reducing the
standard of conduct to gross negligence, the courts should honor a
stipulation that "in no event" should the operator be responsible for
losses to non-operators, but that is not always how the law is applied.
That being the case, would-be operators should seriously consider such
potential liability issues before agreeing to act as operator.
15 04-1373 (La. A-p. 3 Cir. 5/4/05), 901 So. 2d 1238.
10 The Third Circuit issued a subsequent opinion entitled Hardee v. Atlantic Richfield,
which seemed to confuse the issue by suggesting that. under the facts presented, the
prematurity of the claims should be determined later by the jury, but without ruling on the
correctness of the Dore opinion. See 05-1207 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/5/06), 926 So. 2d 736.
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